In his seminal paper of 1928, Ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently, in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments. In particular, it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets. This paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents. A version of Bayesian Implementation is introduced and a recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established. Efficient allocations are renegotiation-proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive probability if the economy does not collapse. If the economy collapses all agents will get zero consumption forever. Thus, including any degree of private information in the neoclassical growth model will deny Ramsey's conjecture, if efficient allocations are considered.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Will modern societies display extreme levels of wealth concentration in the long-run if people discount the future differently? Ramsey [21] conjectured an affirmative answer to this question. 1 These extreme levels of concentration would be the natural outcome to the rational behavior of agents, as long as the market structure allowed for enough consumption smoothing through both time and states of nature. Thus, all consumers except the most patient would live at the subsistence level. The validity of this conjecture has been investigated in different environments. In fact, it turns out that in the standard stochastic neoclassical growth model with the limit assumption of dynamically complete markets, this conjecture is impressively accurate. That is,
given an equilibrium interest rate sequence, impatient consumers will trade away their distant future wealth to consume as much as possible in the relatively near present. 2 The literature has also been trying to analyze this conjecture under more realistic assumptions regarding the market structure. Would this conjecture be valid if some markets are missing? Important contributions have been made in this dimension as well. In general, these attempts have arbitrary closed some markets to analyze how these predictions would change. 3 Considering borrowing constraints, Becker [6] shows that Ramsey's conjecture holds for the stationary equilibria of one-sector economies. 4 Becker and Zilcha [8] study the stochastic version of Becker [6] with similar credit 1 market imperfections. They show that there exist stochastic stationary equilibria where Ramsey's conjecture is not longer valid. See Ghiglino ( [12] , Section 4) for an excellent discussion of this literature.
But there is an another important issue involved here. Suppose that some markets are not present: can extreme levels of wealth concentration be still efficient?I n general, in economies with incomplete markets it is possible to check if the resulting allocation satisfies some efficiency criteria. But after all, why are markets incomplete?
One of the standard arguments to justify different incomplete market structures is the fact that there are informational frictions and therefore some markets will not be present (see, for example, Arrow [3] ). Fundamental contributions were also made regarding this issue in a different branch of the literature. Consider first an endowment economy populated with a large number of ex-ante identical agents that are subject to privately observed idiosyncratic shocks every period. In this environment, Atkeson & Lucas [5] and Green [13] have shown that (constrained) efficient allocations, independently of the feasibility technologies, will display extreme levels of "immiserization": the expected utility level of (almost) every agent in the economy converges to the lower bound with probability one. This result is also present in Thomas & Worral [25] . Wang [27] shows that these results might not be robust to the assumption of considering a finite number of ex-ante identical agents. 5 There were some extensions to this literature to allow for capital accumulation.
Marcet & Marimon [18] study the stochastic growth model with incentive constraints.
They characterize constrained efficient allocations in an economy with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent where investment is unobservable. In this partial equilibrium framework, they find that information constraints affect consumption volatility while the Pareto efficient capital accumulation path can still be decentralized. In an important application of the techniques developed by Abreu, Pearce & Sttacheti [1] 's seminal contribution, Atkeson [4] examines constrained efficient allocations between a risk-averse borrower and a sequence of risk-neutral lenders in an economy with both incomplete enforceability and moral hazard. In particular, investment is unobservable and capital fully depreciates. He shows that capital outflows could be optimal when a low realization of output is observed. In related work, Khan & Ravikumar [15] , [16] introduce capital accumulation in Green's model. There is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents endowed with linear technologies that are subject to privately observed idiosyncratic productivity shocks. For CRRA utility functions, they show that the optimal contract exhibits two-sided voluntary participation and numerical exercises show that both the expected valued and the dispersion of utility entitlements increase through time.
The interaction between these two branches of the literature has not been extensively studied. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The existence of private information provides a basis for market incompleteness. Hence, the main goal of this paper is to characterize the set of efficient allocations in a particular informationally constrained version of the neoclassical growth model with many heterogeneous agents instead of specifying an arbitrary set of markets. That is, as motivated by Townsend [26] 's seminal contribution, I analyze Pareto optimal arrangements "to avoid the imposition of exogenous restrictions and so the nonexecution of some mutually perceived advantageous trade". I will keep the model as simple as possible.
The economy is populated by N heterogeneous, risk-averse, infinitely-lived agents.
Each period agents are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks. These shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. through time and independent across agents. At every date t, the history of realizations are private information for each agent. Agents are endowed with one unit of time each period but they do not value leisure. A neoclassical technology is available at the aggregate level. Since there is private information, it is well-known since Townsend [26] that the relevant set of (constrained) efficient allocations can be history dependent. Hence, standard recursive methods with finite dimensional state spaces do not apply to characterize optimal allocations. This can be solved extending the set of state variables to include next period's "expected discounted utility entitlements" as in the seminal contributions of Abreu et. al. [1] , Spear & Srivastava [23] and Phelan & Townsend [20] .
After introducing a version of Bayesian implementation for this particular dynamic environment, the existence of an efficient recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established. These results might be of interest on their own.
First, the restriction of implementing through Bayesian mechanisms differs from the rest of the literature described, in particular with Wang [27] and Phelan [19] . They introduce, at least implicitly, some hybrid between Dominant-Strategies and Bayesian implementation. There, agents are asked to report truthfully independently of the others' reports today (related to Dominant-Strategies implementation), considering the expected discounted utility attained if all the other agents report truthfully from tomorrow on (related to Bayesian implementation). The set of incentive compatible allocations in this paper contains the set of incentive compatible allocations considered in those papers. With a continuum of agents, as in Atkeson & Lucas [5] , both concepts collapse since agents are individually very "small" and then their own report cannot affect the entitlement to the others.
Second, I establish a version of the Principle of Optimality for this environment: future utilities lie on the frontier of the utility set and therefore ex-ante efficient 4 contracts are renegotiation-proof. This implies that there will never be an incentive to renegotiate the contract since any renegotiation would make at least one agent worse off. Here, the planner can use the free disposal technology available as a commitment device. This does not mean that any agent individually will not have incentives to renegotiate the contract. However, it is assumed that allocations are fully enforceable. In dynamic contracting, ex-ante Pareto efficient allocations need notbeex-postefficient since agents might find that modifications to the original longterm contract are mutually beneficial as future events unfold. This might happen because the planner needs to promise low future expected utility levels to the agents if some states are reported to provide incentives to truthfully report today. But if this happens and ex-ante efficient contracts are not renegotiation-proof, the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforceable might be stretched to the limit.
Some other important properties of the efficient allocation are investigated. In particular, it is shown that it is impossible for the level of expected utility of any agent to go to zero with positive probability in a non-collapsing economy. On the other hand, if the economy collapses the stock of capital drops to zero and thus all agents consume nothing forever. These results provide a remarkably different prediction with respect to a standard result in economies with full information. There, if the marginal utility of consumption goes to infinity when consumption goes to zero, impatient agents will end up consuming nothing in the limit. A novel property of the model presented here is that the introduction of any degree of private information (that is, even if probabilities diffe rf r o m1b ya na r b i t r a r ys m a l ln u m b e r )w i l li m p l y that this result will no longer hold when considering (constrained) Pareto optimal trading arrangements.
Finally, since risk-sharing is provided without restricting transfers additionally to 5 incentive compatibility and feasibility (in particular, an agent can receive a negative net transfer from the other agents in the economy), there might be nonexecuted mutually beneficial trade opportunities in a market economy where all insurance markets are arbitrarily closed (as, for example, in Hugget [14] and Becker & Zilcha [8] ) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the original resource allocation problem with private information, and some basic properties are established. Section 3 proves the existence and describes some properties of an efficient allocation. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains all the proofs.
2T h e E c o n o m y
The economy is populated by a finite number of infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents with names in the set I = {1,...,N} (with typical element n). Time t =0 , 1, 2,... is discrete. There is only one consumption good. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time each period. To simplify, let us assume that agents do not value leisure.
Production possibilities are represented by a standard neoclassical production function. That is, if at date t the stock of capital is K t and the time used to produce is L t , then the total output is given by F (K t ,L t ). I assume that F is increasing in both arguments and thus, given that agents do not value leisure, L t = N each period.
Assumption 1: f : R + → R + is strictly increasing, strictly concave and differentiable. Moreover, there exists K>0 such that f (k) ≥ k if and only if k ≤ K. 6 Each period agent n receives an idiosyncratic preference shock θ n . I assume that θ n takes value in the finite set Θ = {θ 1 ,...,θ J } where θ i > θ j if i>j . Preference 6 Note that this representation is general and it may include capital depreciation.
6
shocks are assumed to be independent across agents and i.i.d. across time for each agent. That is, let π nt (θ j )=π n (θ j ) > 0 be the probability at date t for agent n of having a preference shock θ j . Since the number of agents is finite, there is aggregate uncertainty. Let θ =( θ 1 ,...,θ N ) ∈ Θ N denote the aggregate preference sh oc kw ithp r ob ab i li t yπ(θ)= Q n∈N π n (θ n ). Let µ t+1 be the probability distribution on the measurable space (2 Θ N (t+1) , Θ N(t+1) ) induced by π. That is, µ t+1 (θ t ) is the probability of the aggregate partial history up to date t,
Let S denote the consumption set, which is defin e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y :
Preferences over S are represented by a time-separable expected discounted utility function U : S → R + .M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,i fc ∈ S U (c)=E{
It is assumed that for all n ∈ I, β n ∈ (0, 1) and u n : R + → R is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable, where idiosyncratic preference shocks are multiplicative. Assume also that lim
u 0 n (c t )=+ ∞ for all n ∈ I. Without loss of generality, assume u n (0) = 0 and P θ π n (θ)θ =1for all n. E represents the expectation operator.
Feasible Incentive Compatibility Allocations
Since it is assumed that θ nt and θ t n are private information, agents will be asked to report their own preference shocks. I will assume that there is no way to audit or verify the answer that any agent chooses to give. I also assume that allocations are fully enforceable.
Given a privately observed partial history θ t n up to date t by agent n, he chooses to report z nt (θ t n ) ∈ Θ at date t. Let z n = {z nt (θ t n )} ∞ t=0 represent agent n 0 s sequence of reporting strategies where z nt :
the sequence of aggregate reporting strategies. Let z * n be the truthtelling reporting strategy for agent n where z * nt (θ t n )=θ nt for all t and θ t n ∈ Θ t+1 . Note that since each individual only observes his own preference shock, agent n 0 s reporting strategy depends only upon his own partial history.
To interpret this, consider any aggregate realization θ t up to date t and any aggregate reporting strategy z. Consumption for each agent n is given
Similarly, the stock of capital at period t +1 will be given by
Any pair (C, K 0 ) satisfying these properties is called an allocation.
for all t,a l lθ t and k 0 = k.
The levels of capital will be also restricted to those levels that are sustainable.
Suppose that K t (θ t−1 ) ≤ K. Since consumption must be nonnegative, from feasibility and the definition of an allocation we have that for all t and for all reports θ
as the set of sustainable capital levels. It will be assumed that k 0 ∈ X and therefore any feasible allocation will necessarily satisfy that
for all t and all θ t .
Suppose that some arbitrary aggregate partial history θ t−1 has been reported. Let z 0 be an aggregate continuation reporting strategy from period t onwards. Given an 8 allocation (C, K 0 ), define the level of expected discounted utility entitled to agent n at date t for each z 0 as follows:
Here z 0 (θ) is the continuation reporting strategy from period t +1 onwards induced by z 0 when the first element θ is kept constant. When t =0,w ew r i t ef o ra n yz
The following definition says that an allocation is incentive compatible if truthtelling is the best response for each agent whenever he considers that the other agents will truthfully report their own preference shocks not only today but also in the future.
agents, for all t ≥ 0,a l lθ t−1 and all z 0
for all e θ n and θ n .
This can be interpreted as the natural extension of Bayesian implementation for this particular dynamic environment, which differs from the related literature as mentioned in the Introduction. Note that Definition 2 takes into account that agents can choose a continuation reporting strategy every period after they have observed their own preference shock histories. The restriction of analyzing incentive compatible allocations is without loss of generality since it can be shown that the relevant version of the celebrated Revelation Principle holds. 7 Roughly speaking, if there is any way in which some insurance can be provided through any allocation then there is an equivalent incentive compatible way in which agents report their true preference shocks.
The economy can be interpreted as both an N agent version of the economy studied by Atkeson & Lucas [5] with capital accumulation and a private information version of the model studied in, among many others, Becker [6] and Becker & Zilcha [8] .
The notion of efficiency that will be analyzed throughout the paper can now be defined. Note that in this definition we are already using the fact that the allocation must be incentive compatible. (1)- (2) and
Let Ψ(k) be the utility possibility set for this economy when k ∈ X is the initial stock of capital. That is,
It is important to mention that if an efficient allocation exists, then it will also be (constrained) Pareto optimal. This follow from the fact that the utility frontier will in fact be strictly decreasing in this environment.
This correspondence Ψ, mapping X into R N , has some properties that can be established immediately.
Remark 2 It is uniformly bounded. That is, for all k ∈ X there exists a bounded
To see this, note that for all agent n,
To see this, consider the following allocation: given k>0, define for all for all t ≥ 0 and
Note that (C, K 0 ) is an incentive compatible, feasible allocation given the definitions of an allocation, reporting strategies and feasibility. Note also that U n (C, K 0 )=0for
The following Lemma will be useful to establish some results "in the limit". This result allows the restriction to one-period deviation when one considers incentive compatible allocations. 8 Lemma 1 Let (C, K 0 ) be any feasible al location at k ∈ X. Consider any agent n ∈ I and let z 0 n ,z 0m n be continuation reporting strategies where z m ns = z ns for all s ≤ m and z m ns = z * ns thereafter. Then, for all t ≥ 0 and any aggregate report θ
The Full Information Case
Iw i l lb r i e fly discuss Ramsey's conjecture in the model described above with full information. That is, I will consider the allocation problem just described without the incentive compatibility constraints. Since it is easy to establish that both the First and Second Welfare Theorems hold, the property described below will also hold in a economy with dynamically complete markets.
Consider the following problem that the planner has to solve:
Note that nonnegativity of consumption is implicit in the definition of an allocation.
Suppose that β 1 > β n for all n 6 =1. Necessary first order conditions for the unique interior solution will imply that for all n ∈ I, for all t and for all θ
Here, α n > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to agent n (with α 1 =1)and λ t (θ t ) > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the feasibility constraint at period t if θ t is the aggregate partial history. Thus, for all t and for all θ
Since (β 1 /β n ) t → +∞ as t goes to infinity, it follows from (3) that
Given that consumption is uniformly bounded from above, it is clear then that
. Therefore, only the patient agent consumes in the limit.
Impatient agents would want to trade future wealth for present consumption and therefore these individuals would have zero consumption asymptotically.T h e s e extreme levels of concentration were initially conjectured by Ramsey [21] . The validity of this conjecture for different environments was discussed in the Introduction.
In what follows, one of the main results is that with the introduction of any degree of private information this result no longer holds.
Characterization
In this section I will first characterize the utility possibility correspondence defined by Ψ. After that, I will study some important properties of an efficient allocation.
Let W : X → R N be a nonempty, uniformly bounded correspondence. Let (c, k 0 ) be a vector-valued function where c :
is admissible with respect to W at k ∈ X if (1) w is a continuation value function with respect to W ;
For al l n ∈ I and for all θ n , e θ n ∈ Θ
Let (c, k 0 ,w) be admissible with respect to W at k ∈ X and define for all n ∈ I e n (c, k
Given k ∈ X, define the following operator:
This operator maps the set of uniformly bounded correspondences into themselves.
The following definition extends to correspondences some definitions given by Abreu et. al. [1] for sets. 9
Proposition 2 Let W be a uniformly bounded and self-generating correspondence.
The intuition for this result can be interpreted as follows. If a correspondence W is self-generating, any value in W (k) is also in its image Φ(W )(k). This allows one to choose any vector of utility levels of Φ(W )(k) and transform it period-by period recursively into a feasible incentive compatible allocation having the same utility levels.
The next result establishes that Ψ is self-generating itself and therefore is a fixed point of the operator Φ.
9 A related extension was made by Atkeson [4] .
T h u s ,a n yu t i l i t yl e v e lt h a tc a nb ea t t a i n e dw i t ha na l l o c a t i o n(C, K 0 ) can also be attained by delivering to each agent consumption for today, assigning capital for tomorrow and promising to each agent some contingent levels of expected utility from tomorrow on.
This characterization of the utility possibility correspondence turns out to be extremely important both to establish the existence of an efficient allocation and to investigate some of its properties. Below, I will discuss sufficient conditions such that a version of the Principle of the Optimality holds and thus the original problem can be restated as one genuinely recursive.
Existence of an Efficient Allocation
I will proceed to show that for every k ∈ X, there exists an efficient allocation as defined before. To do that, a few properties of the operator Φ need to be shown.
Define the graph of a correspondence W : X → R N by the following set:
The next Lemma shows that the operator Φ preserves compactness.
This follows directly from the definition of the operator Φ. T h el a s tr e s u l tw en e e d to show the existence of an efficient allocation is the following.
Lemma 5 Ψ has a compact graph.
Given that Ψ has a compact graph, it follows that for all k ∈ X, Ψ(k) is a compact subset of R N . We need to introduce some notation. Let
For any k ∈ X and given
It is clear that for all k ∈ X and given u −1 ∈ Ψ −1 (k), Ψ 1 (k, u −1 ) is a compact subset of R.G i v e nk and u −1 , define the following function:
Therefore, it follows that for all k ∈ X and given u −1 ∈ Ψ −1 (k), there exists (C * ,K 0 * ) such that
which is, by definition, an efficient allocation at (k, u −1 ). It also follows by Proposition 3 that there exists an equivalent efficient recursive allocation (c * ,k 0 * ,w * ) (which is admissible with respect to Ψ at k) such that
It will be said that a recursive allocation (c, k 0 ,w) is promise keeping at u −1 if u n = e n (c, k 0 ,w) for all n ∈ {2,...,N}.
The next property of the correspondence Ψ will be crucial to show the continuity of V.
Lemma 6 Ψ has a convex graph.
Hence, since Ψ is a compact-valued correspondence (Lemma 5) with a convex graph (Lemma 6), it follows that Ψ is continuous and compact-valued. 
Some Properties of an Efficient Allocation
Some important properties of an efficient allocation (or its equivalent recursive representation) can now be investigated. Lemma 7 below shows that efficient trading arrangements will imply multiperiod relationships as in Townsend [26] . The nature of these multiperiod relationships comes from the incentive compatibility constraints to circumvent information difficulties. Efficient allocations are thus history dependent: each agent's report today affects not only his present consumption but also his consumption from tomorrow on. Given that shocks are i.i.d., this would not be the case with full information.
The first of these inequalities has an implication that additionally distinguishes this environment from the rest of the literature. Either with a continuum of agents or with a finite number of agents with the implementation device as in Wang [27] and Phelan [19] , consumption is increasing in the preference shock. That is, the more the agent values consumption today, the higher the transfer today, independently of the others' reports. Here, an agent will receive a random vector of consumption depending upon others' reports, which is increasing with respect to his preference shock in the sense of second order stochastic dominance. More precisely, the induced distribution of c n (θ j , ·) second order stochastically dominates the induced distribution of c n (θ i , ·) whenever j>i . Therefore, the conditional expectation of the momentary utility will be increasing in the reported preference shock. On the other hand, agents reporting relatively lower preference shocks are rewarded with a relatively higher level of conditional expected utility from tomorrow on.
A further characterization of V is essential to show the next results. In particular, the potential nonconvexity imposed by the incentive compatibility constraints might make it difficult to apply standard arguments to show the continuity of V .I nt h i s sense, the fact that the preference shocks are multiplicative will play an important role in simplifying the analysis. The main properties are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 (i) V is strictly increasing in k and strictly decreasing in
The next result shows that some of the conditions in Lemma 7 will hold with strict inequality. Thus, Proposition 9 basically establishes that an allocation providing no insurance for some agent cannot be efficient.
Proposition 9
Given any k ∈ X and u −1 ∈ Ψ −1 (k), consider an arbitrary recursive allocation (c, k 0 , w) admissible with respect to Ψ at k and promise keeping at u −1 .
Consider any agent such that u n > 0 and suppose that for all θ n ∈ Θ
The intuition of this result can be grasped as follows. Suppose that an agent's report does not affect his conditional expected utility from tomorrow on. The incentive compatibility constraints will imply that the conditional expectation of the momentary utility will also be constant. This can be dominated by an allocation providing more consumption (in the sense discussed above) to agents with relatively high preference shocks and thus providing them some insurance. 11 Thenextresultsho wsthattheex-an teefficient allocation is in fact renegotiationproof. This is very important because otherwise ex-post mutually beneficial renegotiations must be assumed away.
Proposition 10 Given any
This result means that the ex-ante efficient allocation will be ex-post efficient. 12 That is, the continuation utility levels delivered by any efficient allocation will be on the utility possibility frontier. Hence, it will never be mutually agreed to renegotiate transfers implied by an efficient allocation. This does not mean that any agent individually will not have incentives to renegotiate the contract. However, it has been assumed that allocations are enforceable at the individual level. It is important to note that to get this result it is crucial that the planner can use the free disposal technology available as a commitment device. Here, the ability of the planner to manipulate the stock of capital is crucial to make "credible" that there will not be ex-post incentives to renegotiate the continuation of the original contract.
In the Conclusion there is an additional discussion about the possibility of collapsing economies.
From now on, we say that the economy collapses if there exists some (k, u −1 )
such that k 0 * (θ)(k, u −1 )=0for some θ. Note that when the economy collapses, no 11 Of course, if u n =0then u n = w n =0is part of any solution. 12 See Fudenberg, Holmstrom & Milgrom [11] and Wang [28] for related results. Also, a similar result is present in Wang [27] (Proposition 2, pg.582) but the proof presented there seems to be at least incomplete. More specifically, when showing this result, it does not consider the fact that the operator is not monotone and then his condition (9) is not necessarily satisfied by the recursive allocation being considered in the last part of the proof. agent will consume from next period on. Very importantly, this is independent of any their particular characteristics, including their discount factors. But, in which situation might the economy collapse? While trying to provide incentives to report preference shocks truthfully, the planner might choose to "penalize" an aggregate report (θ,...,θ) by transferring higher levels of consumption today at the expense of low levels of consumption from tomorrow on. The extreme case would be zero consumption forever for all agents. Now, I will show that in an economy not collapsing in the limit, no agent's expected utility can converge to any number with positive probability. In particular, it cannot converge to the lower bound as initially conjectured by Ramsey [21] .
Let {U nt } ∞ t=0 be the stochastic process representing agent n 0 s expected utility entitlement given an efficient allocation. Call Ω = {{θ t } ∞ t=0 : θ t ∈ Θ N for all t} and let B(Ω) be the Borel σ − field of Ω. Let µ be the unique probability measure on
(Ω,B(Ω)) generatedb ythefinite-dimensional distributions (µ t ) (asanapplicationof the Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem).
for some n} =0.
Having this result, we can then conclude that the introduction of any degree 
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied some properties of efficient allocations in a version of the stochastic neoclassical growth model with many heterogeneous agents and private information. The first step was to prove that the original allocation problem had a recursive formulation in the spirit of Abreu et. al [1] and Spear & Srivastava [23] . This work has also introduced a simple version of Bayesian implementation for this particular dynamic environment and has established that the ex-ante efficient allocations are ex-post efficient where future utility entitlements lie in the utility possibility frontier. Therefore, long-term efficient contracts are renegotiation-proof in this environment. To get this result it is important that the planner can manipulate the stock of capital for next period to make these allocations sequentially efficient.
Then, two main properties of an efficient allocation are additionally discussed.
First, any efficient allocation should provide some insurance to the agents against idiosyncratic preference shocks. Unlike most of the literature considering an arbitrary set of incomplete markets, agents can make transfers contingent upon their own idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The type of analysis developed in this paper avoids the presence of some ex-ante mutually beneficial nonexecuted trade opportunities.
Secondly, I have shown that the level of expected discounted utility cannot con-21 verge with positive probability to the lower bound in a non-collapsing economy. In a collapsing economy, the stock of capital drops to zero and all agents consume nothing.
These results show that a standard property of efficient allocations in economies with full information, initially conjectured by Ramsey [21] , does not longer hold when any degree of private information is considered. In those economies, and under standard assumptions, the impatient agents will end up consuming nothing in the limit and therefore the level of expected utility converges to the lower bound. The introduction of any degree of private information and the imposition of incentive compatibility constraints imply that, for paths with positive probability, any efficient allocation will need to spread out future expected utility according to the reports. If the expected utility level converges, this property cannot be satisfied. On the other hand, if the economy collapses all agents consume zero independently of their degree of patience.
Some potential extensions might be mentioned. In the first place, a natural theoretical extension would be to try to characterize in more detail both the dynamic and the limiting properties of this economy. At the level of generality presented in this paper, this might not be a standard task. However, an important issue must be mentioned. Nothing in this paper has ruled out the case where the economy collapses with probability one. In this case, the results of the paper are still important to answer the main question regarding Ramsey's conjecture, but are not very relevant in most of the other dimensions. Work in progress, however, shows that under certain standard assumptions, collapsing economies are rare events with zero probability. 13 Secondly, an algorithm to compute efficient allocations in this environment might be developed. 14 Numerical results could allow computing, for example, welfare losses 13 A priori, one cannot consider this possibility completely unlikely. For example, for a dynamic agency problem with capital accumulation, Di Giannatale [10] numerically shows that the principal's stock of capital monotonically decreases over time. I would like to thank an anonymous associate editor for alerting me to this issue. Details are available upon request. 14 Sleet & Yeltekin [22] is an important step to properly tackle this problem.
imposed by the information structure when compared with efficient allocations in economies with full information. Moreover, one could also compare the basic welfare properties of the economy described here with those emerging in economies where different arbitrary market structures are imposed. In general, one of the most relevant unanswered questions can then be summarized as follows: does private information real ly matter? 15 These issues are left for future research.
5A p p e n d i x P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Consider any m ≥ 0. Note that since for all t ≥ 0 and any
Using this inequality we can get that
Since consumption must be uniformly bounded, the desired result is obtained taking lim sup m→∞ in the previous expression (β n ∈ (0, 1) ∀ n).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Let w 0 ∈ Φ(W, k) for some given k ∈ X. We need to show that there exists a feasible and incentive compatible allocation (C, K 0 ) such
Step 1.S i n c ew 0 ∈ Φ(W, k), there exists (c, k 0 ,w)(w 0 ) admissible with respect
since W is assumed to be self-generating. It is then clear that we can recursively define, for all t ≥ 0, for all θ t and given w 0 ,
Note that in the construction of this candidate allocation (C, K 0 ), we are only considering truthtelling continuation reporting strategies. We claim now that for all n ∈ I, for all t ≥ 0 and for all θ t−1
To see this, note that it follows from definition that
Since W is a uniformly bounded correspondence and {C t } ∞ t=0 is uniformly bounded by construction, taking the limsup as s →∞we get (5) as desired since β n ∈ (0, 1) for all n ∈ I.
Step 2. We need to show that (C, K 0 ) is a feasible and incentive compatible allocation.
(a) Feasibility follows because (c(θ t ),k 0 (θ t ),w(θ t ))(W t (θ t−1 )) are admissible with respect to W at K t (θ t−1 ) ∈ X for all t and all θ t−1 .
(b) Incentive compatibility of our candidate allocation will be proved as usual.
First, we will prove that it holds for strategies that have a finite number of deviation from truthtelling. Then it will follow then from Lemma 1 that it cannot be violated by any reporting strategy with infinitely many deviation from truthtelling.
It follows from admissibility, equality (5) and by construction of (C, K 0 ) that
Fix an arbitrary θ; put for all t ≥ 0 and all θ
Clearly, (C,K) is feasible at k 1 (θ)by construction. Also it is incentive compatible since (C, K) actually is (see condition (2)). Therefore, since θ was arbitrary, we can conclude that Ψ is self-generating.
Since Ψ is uniformly bounded (see Remark (2) above), we can then conclude that
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . Let {u j ,k j } ∞ t=0 be a sequence in graph(Φ(W )). Then, for all j there exists (c j ,k 0j ,w j ) admissible with respect to W at k j where
Given that {k j } ∞ t=0 ⊂ X, it has a convergent subsequence with limit k ∈ X.B u t then since {w j ,k 0j } ∞ j=0 is a sequence in graph(Ψ), a compact set, it has a convergent subsequence as well. Also, by the definition of admissibility, {c j } is also in a compact set having then a convergent subsequence (and the limit satisfies all the conditions imposed by admissibility). Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ N , there exists (c(θ), k 0 (θ), w(θ))
being the limit point to this convergent subsequence. Clearly, given that momentary utility function are assumed to be continuous and weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, (c(θ), k 0 (θ), w(θ)) θ∈Θ N is admissible with respect to k. Therefore,
which establishes that graph(Φ(W )) is a compact set.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5. We already know that graph(Ψ) is a bounded set. We need to show that it is also closed. Define the correspondence Ψ such that
Clearly, it follows by definition that graph(Ψ) ⊂ graph(Ψ). By the previous remark, graph(Φ(Ψ)) ⊂ graph(Φ(Ψ)).S i n c eΨ = Φ(Ψ),gra p h(Φ(Ψ)) = graph(Ψ) and
Since graph(Ψ) is closed by definition, from Lemma 4 we have that graph(Φ(Ψ))is also closed. Hence, graph(Ψ)=closure(graph(Ψ)) ⊂ closure(graph(Φ(Ψ))) = graph(Φ(Ψ)) and therefore Ψ(k) ⊂ Φ(Ψ)(k) for all k ∈ X. But then Ψ is selfgenerating and from Proposition 1 we know that Ψ(k) ⊂ Ψ(k) for all k ∈ X. This implies that graph(Ψ) ⊂ graph(Ψ) and thus graph(Ψ) is closed.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 . We complete this proof in two steps.
Step 1. We claim that if graph(W ) is convex, then graph(Φ(W )) is also convex.
Let (u, k), (u, k) ∈ graph(Φ(W )). We need to show that for all α ∈ [0, 1],u α ≡ (αu +(1− α)u) ∈ Φ(W )(αk +(1− α)k). We know that there exist (c, k 0 ,w) and (c, k 0 , w) that are admissible with respect to W at k and k, respectively, such that for all n u n = e n (c, k 0 ,w) and u n = e n (c, k 0 , w)
We need to show that there exists (c α ,k 0α ,w α ) that is admissible with respect to
continuous for all n, using the Intermediate Value Theorem, define c α n (θ) such that
) for all n and for all θ. Note that since u n is concave, it follows that c α n (θ) ≤ αc n (θ)+(1− α)c n (θ) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, define
for all n and for all θ. Note that since it is assumed that graph(W ) is convex, then w α n (θ) ∈ W (k 0α (θ)) for all θ. Also, the alternative allocation is clearly feasible and incentive compatible by construction since f is concave. Thus, (c α ,k 0α ,w α ) is admissible with respect to to W at k α . Since by construction e n (c α ,k 0α ,w α )=u α n for all n, we are done.
Step 2. For any set A ⊆ R N , let co(A) be the convex hull of A.D e fine the correspondence e Ψ such that graph( e Ψ)=co(graph( e Ψ)). Clearly, graph(Ψ) ⊆ graph( e Ψ)
and therefore graph(Φ(Ψ)) ⊆ graph(Φ( e Ψ)). Since Ψ = Φ(Ψ) by Proposition 3,
. Since the graph( e Ψ) is convex by definition, it follows by
Step 1 that graph(Φ( e Ψ)) is also convex. Therefore,
But then e Ψ(k) ⊆ Φ( e Ψ)(k) for all k ∈ X and therefore e Ψ is self-generating. By Proposition 3, it follows that e Ψ(k) ⊆ Ψ(k) for all k ∈ X and then graph(Ψ) ⊇ graph( e Ψ). Therefore, we can conclude that Ψ has a convex graph.
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . Consider θ n > e θ n and note that
Also, from the previous inequalities, it follows that
as desired. is efficient at (k, u −1 ). Consider the following alternative allocation (c,
. Let c n (θ)=c * n (θ) for all n 6 =1and for all θ. Also, put w n (θ)=w * n (θ) for all θ and for all n. Define ² j ∈ (0,²] such that
Finally, it is easy to see that {² j } J j:1 can be chosen strictly positive such that incentive compatibility is satisfied. For example, if Θ = {θ, θ} where θ < θ, put ² and ² such that P
This alternative allocation is admissible with respect to Ψ at k and
A similar argument shows that V is strictly decreasing in u −1 but some additional comments might help to get some of the intuition. Suppose that for some agent n,his utility is reduced from u n to u n . Any admissible and promise keeping allocation will assigns a lower level of consumption either today or in the future (or both). Suppose that this happens at period t if θ t−1 has been reported. This will allow to increase the level of aggregate capital available at t +1 and thus one could increase consumption for agent 1 whenever θ t−1 has been reported and for all θ t . Since µ(θ t−1 ) > 0 for all θ t−1 , this will increase agent 1's expected utility.
(ii) N o ww ew i l ls h o wt h a tV is a continuous function. First, observe that
} is a continuous function with respect to (c, k 0 ,w). Then, since Ψ is a correspondence mapping X into R N with a compact and convex graph, it follows that Ψ is a compact-valued and continuous correspondence (Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [24] , Theorem 3.4 and 3.5).
is admissible with respect to Ψ at k and u n = e n (c, k 0 ,w) for all n 6 =1}
Since Ψ is a continuous correspondence on a compact domain, it is easy to check that A is a compact set. Also, it is a standard exercise to check that Γ is a continuous, compact valued correspondence since Ψ is a continuous correspondence on a compact domain and e n (c, k 0 ,w) are continuous functions for all n. 16 Therefore, it follows from the Theorem of the Maximum that V is a continuous function on A.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . Assume, on the contrary, that
, where u n = e n (c, k 0 , w). Without loss of generality, suppose that n 6 =1
and this imply that V (k, u −1 ) > 0 (as it will be clear, the whole proof goes through when n =1). 17 Assume to simplify that Θ = {θ, θ} where θ < θ. First, we claim that if agent n is entitled to some positive expected utility level, then c n (θ, θ −n ) > 0 for all θ −n . Let λ n θ i ,θ j be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to ICC corresponding to agent n giving incentives to reveal the observed preference shock θ i instead of θ j .
Similarly, let γ(θ n , θ −n ) and η n be the agent n 0 s Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the feasibility constraint and to the promise keeping constraint, respectively, when t h ea g g r e g a t es t a t ei s(θ n , θ −n ) ( η 1 =1 ). Consider now the necessary FOC with respect to c n (θ, θ −n ):
16 See Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [24] , Exercises 3.12 and 3.13. 17 If V (k, u−1)=0, then it follows that c1(θ)=w1(θ)=0for all θ.
with equality if
θ < 0 (η n > 0 if agent n is entitled with a positive utility level). Now consider the necessary FOC with respect to c n (θ, θ −n ), which can be written:
for all θ n ∈ Θ, it follows that u n > 0. Therefore, it must be that, for some e θ −n , c n (θ, e θ −n ) > 0. Observe also that π(θ, e θ −n ) > 0.
Let e θ =(θ, e θ −n ) and define an alternative recursive allocation as follows:
For all θ 6 = e θ, put e c n (θ)=c n (θ), e w n (θ)=w n (θ) and e k 0 (θ)=k 0 (θ). For all i 6 = n, put simply e c i (θ)=c i (θ) and e w i (θ)=w i (θ) for all θ. We will restrict (λ, δ n ) À 0 such that (e c, e k 0 , e w) is admissible with respect to Ψ at k and e n (e c, e k 0 , e w) >e n (c, k 0 , w).
Step 1. Note that by continuity of V , (λ, δ n ) c a nb ec h o s e ns u c ht h a t
since V is decreasing in w −1 and increasing in k 0 . Therefore, we can find (λ, δ n ) À 0 such that ( e w 1 ( e θ), e w n ( e θ), { e w i ( e θ)} i∈I/{1,n} ) ∈ Ψ( e k 0 ( b θ)).
Step 2. If λ > 0 and c n ( e θ) − λ ≥ 0, then feasibility is satisfied by definition.
Step 3. Incentive Compatibility. Since the recursive allocation (c, k 0 , w) is assumed to be admissible with respect to Ψ at k, there is nothing to check for agent i 6 = n.
Consider agent n and for c n ( e θ) − λ ≥ 0 define g n (θ, λ)=θ[u n (c n ( e θ)) − u n (c n ( e θ) − λ)]
Note that g n (θ, 0) = 0 and it is strictly increasing in λ for λ > 0. Also if λ > 0, then g n (θ, λ) <g n (θ, λ). Hence, since (c, k 0 , w) is incentive compatible, it is easy to check that X θ −n π(θ −n )[θu n (e c n (θ, θ −n )) + β n e w n (θ, θ −n )] ≥ X θ −n π(θ −n )[θu n (e c 1 (θ, θ −n )) + β n e w n (θ, θ −n )]
is satisfied if
Similarly, X θ −n π(θ −n )[θu n (e c n (θ, θ −n )) + β n e w n (θ, θ −n )] ≥ X θ −n π(θ −n )[θu n (e c n (θ, θ −n )) + β n e w n (θ, θ −n )]
Put g n (θ, λ)=β n δ n >g n (θ, λ) and then conditions (8), (9) and ( Step 4. Finally, note that for all i 6 = n, e i (e c, e k 0 , e w)=e i (c, k 0 , w) by construction.
Also, observe that e n (e c, e k 0 , e w)= X θ π(θ){u n (e c n (θ)) + β n e w n (θ)} = e n (c, k 0 , w)+π( b θ)[β n δ n − g n (θ, λ)] = e u n >e n (c, k 0 , w)=u n Hence, (e c, e k 0 , e w) is a recursive allocation which admissible with respect to Ψ(k) such that e 1 (e c, e k 0 , e w)=V (k, u −1 ),e n (e c, e k 0 , e w)=e u n >u n ,e i (e c, e k 0 , e w)=u i for all i ∈ I/{1,n}
Let e u −1 =( e u n , {u n } i∈I/{1,n} ).S i n c e V (k, u −1 ) >V(k, e u −1 ) ≥ e 1 (e c, e k 0 , e w) by Lemma 8, we get the desired contradiction. Since V (0,w * −1 )=0for any w * −1 , this implies that k 0 * ( e θ) > 0. Since V is continuous, there exists 0 ≤ k 0 ( e θ) <k 0 * ( e θ) such that V (k 0 ( e θ),w * −1 ( e θ)) = 0. Finally, since V is continuous and strictly decreasing in k, it follows by the mean value theorem that there exists some k 0 ( e θ) ≤ k 0 * * ( e θ) <k 0 * ( e θ) such that w * 1 ( e θ)=V (k 0 * * ( e θ),w * −1 ( e θ)). The alternative recursive allocation (c * ,k 0 * * ,w * ) is incentive compatible, promise keeping and feasible by construction since a free disposal technology is available. It is immediate that in fact (c * ,k 0 * * ,w * ) is also efficient at (k, u −1 ).
P r oo fo fP r o po s i t i o n1 1 . Denote ∆(k, U n )={{θ t } ∞ t=0 :l i m t→∞ K t+1 (θ t )=k>0
and lim t→∞ U nt (θ t )=U n ∈ Ψ n (k) for some n}. Given (k 0 ,U 0 ),t a k ea n y{θ t } ∞ t=0 ∈ ∆(k, U n ) and consider the path of the following stochastic vector
where w * (θ)(K t ,U t ) ∈ Ψ(k 0 * (θ)(K t ,U t )) for all t and all θ ∈ Θ N .A l s o ,f o ra l lt
θ∈Θ N π(θ){θ n u n (c * n (θ)(K t ,U t )) + β n w * n (θ)(K t ,U t )}
Note that this is a sequence in a compact set and therefore it will have a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality, assume that the relevant subsequence is the sequence itself. Denote the corresponding limit point by { b k, b U,b c, b k 0 , b w}.N o t et h a t b k = k and b U n = U n .
Step 1. We claim that (b c, b k 0 , b w) is admissible with respect to Ψ at b k. Moreover, it is efficient at ( b k, b U −1 ).
To see this, note firstthatbydefinition (w * (θ)(K t ,U t ),k 0 * (θ)(K t ,U t )) ∈ graph(Ψ)
for all t and all θ ∈ Θ N . Since Ψ has a compact graph, it follows that for all θ ∈ Θ N ( b w(θ), b k 0 (θ)) ∈ graph(Ψ) and then b w(θ) ∈ Ψ( b k 0 (θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ N .
Since weak inequalities are preserved in the limit and by continuity of f ,itisalso true that for all θ ∈ Θ N Step 2. Since in this case the economy does not collapse in the limit by assumption, consider any agent h such that b U h > 0. We claim that there exists e θ −h such that either (a)l i m t→∞
